The TON blockchain has emerged as a promising platform, but for institutions (wallets, exchanges, custodians etc.) looking to offer Toncoin staking to their customers, current options come with serious limitations. From high staking minimums to complex pool management, existing solutions fall short of meeting the needs of large-scale, flexible staking.
Recognizing this gap, we have launched TON Pool – a staking solution designed to meet the unique requirements of institutional players while making Toncoin staking simpler, more efficient, and scalable.
The TON ecosystem currently offers the Nominator Pool and Single Nominator contracts as staking options. However, both models restrict the number of delegators and impose high minimum stake requirements, which limits accessibility for larger institutions that manage staking services for numerous clients. These limitations force institutions to distribute stakes manually across multiple pools, adding operational complexity and increasing transaction fees, while impacting the final yield. (We covered the current TON staking mechanisms in detail here.)
With these pain points in mind, we saw an opportunity to create a tailored solution that eliminates these barriers and optimizes staking for our customers needs.
TON Pool addresses the shortcomings of current models by providing a flexible, high-efficiency staking solution that scales for larger institutions and various service providers. TON Pool aggregates Toncoin from an unlimited number of users into a single pool, offering seamless in-protocol distribution across multiple validators and removing the need for complex management. The result? A more streamlined, cost-effective, and yield-optimized staking experience for institutions and their customers.
TON Pool is designed for:
One of the most significant advantages of TON Pool is its streamlined staking flow. Here’s a comparison of how staking works with traditional models versus TON Pool:
With TON Pool, customers no longer need to juggle multiple addresses or pay per transaction. Instead, they delegate once, paying a single fee, while all technical complexities are managed seamlessly within the protocol.
“TON Pool is our answer to the challenges institutions face when staking on the TON blockchain. We built this solution to remove unnecessary steps, lower costs, and provide a scalable option for institutions that require a higher degree of flexibility. TON Pool makes staking more accessible and profitable, which we believe is essential to driving the TON ecosystem forward,” - Brian Fabian Crain, CEO, Chorus One.
For more details about TON Pool and to get exclusive discounted commission rates, reach out at staking@chorus.one, and sign up now to be among the first to experience streamlined, scalable Toncoin staking.
Chorus One is one of the largest institutional staking providers globally, operating infrastructure for over 60 Proof-of-Stake (PoS) networks, including Ethereum, Cosmos, Solana, Avalanche, Near, and others. Since 2018, we have been at the forefront of the PoS industry, offering easy-to-use, enterprise-grade staking solutions, conducting industry-leading research, and investing in innovative protocols through Chorus One Ventures. As an ISO 27001 certified provider, Chorus One also offers slashing and double-signing insurance to its institutional clients. For more information, visit chorus.one or follow us on LinkedIn, X (formerly Twitter), and Telegram.
Our latest episode welcomes Bo Du, Founder of Polymer Labs! 🔥
In this episode of the Chorus One Podcast, hosted by our Research Analyst, Kam Benbrik, Bo shares his journey from Web 2.0 to DeFi and discusses the mission of Polymer Labs in enhancing blockchain interoperability.
Key topics include the intricacies of rollup mechanisms (OP stack vs. Arbitrum), the importance and challenges of blockchain interoperability, and Polymer's integration with the Cosmos ecosystem. Bo also explores the future of scalable infrastructure, the trade-offs in decentralizing sequencers, the economic implications of ZK technology, and the incentivization of relayers in the IBC ecosystem.
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About Chorus One
Chorus One is one of the largest institutional staking providers globally, operating infrastructure for over 60 Proof-of-Stake (PoS) networks, including Ethereum, Cosmos, Solana, Avalanche, Near, and others. Since 2018, we have been at the forefront of the PoS industry, offering easy-to-use, enterprise-grade staking solutions, conducting industry-leading research, and investing in innovative protocols through Chorus One Ventures. As an ISO 27001 certified provider, Chorus One also offers slashing and double-signing insurance to its institutional clients. For more information, visit chorus.one or follow us on LinkedIn, X (formerly Twitter), and Telegram.
Due to the unique architecture of blockchains, block proposers can insert, censor, or sort user transactions in a way that extracts value from each block before it's added to the blockchain.
These manipulations, called MEV or Maximum Extractable Value, come in various forms. The most common are arbitrage¹, liquidations², NFT mints³, and sandwiching⁴. Arbitrage involves exploiting price differences for the same asset across markets. Liquidations occur in lending protocols when a borrower’s collateral drops in value, allowing others to buy it at a discount. NFT mints can be profitable when high-demand NFTs are resold after minting.
Most types of MEV can benefit the ecosystem by helping with price discovery (arbitrage) or preventing lending protocols from accruing bad debt (liquidations). However, sandwiching is different. It involves an attacker front-running a user’s trade on a DEX and selling immediately for a profit. This harms the ecosystem by forcing users to pay a consistently worse price.
Solana's MEV landscape differs from Ethereum's due to its high speed, low latency, lack of a public mempool, and unique transaction processing. Without a public mempool for viewing unconfirmed transactions, MEV searchers (actors specializing in finding MEV opportunities⁵) send transactions to RPC nodes directly, which then forward them to validators. This setup enables searchers to work with RPC providers to submit a specifically ordered selection of transactions.
Moreover, the searchers don't know the leader's geographical location, so they send multiple transactions through various RPC nodes to improve their chances of being first. This spams the network as they compete to extract MEV—if you're first, you win.
Jito
A key addition to the Solana MEV landscape is Jito, who released a fork for the Solana Labs client. On a high level, the Jito client enables searchers to tip validators to include a bundle of transactions in the order that extracts the most value for the searcher. The validators can then share the revenue from the tips with their delegators.
These revenues are substantial. Currently, the Jito-Solana client operates on 80% of validators and generates thousands of SOL daily in tips from searchers. However, searchers keep a portion of each tip, so the total tip amounts don’t reveal the full MEV picture. Moreover, the atomic arbitrage market is considerable, and as we’ll explore later, Jito's tips don’t give an accurate estimate of the atomic MEV extracted.
Jito⁶ introduced a few new concepts to the Solana MEV landscape:
There’s more to the current MEV landscape on Solana, particularly concerning spam transactions, which largely result from unsuccessful arbitrage attempts, and the various mitigation strategies (such as priority fees, stake-weighted quality of service, and co-location of searchers and nodes). However, since these details are not central to the focus of this article, we will set them aside for now.
It's still early for Solana MEV, and until recently, Jito was the only major solution focused on boosting rewards for delegators. Following the same open-source principles, the Paladin team introduced a validator-level bot⁷ and an accompanying token that accrues value from the MEV collected by the bot.
The main idea behind Paladin is this:
Paladin’s success, therefore, depends on validators choosing honesty over toxic MEV extraction by running the Paladin bot.
Bots like Paladin⁸ operate at the validator level, enabling them to capitalize on opportunities that arise after Jito bundles and other transactions are sent to the validator for inclusion in a block.
In this scenario, once the bot assesses the impact of the transactions and bundles, it inserts its transactions into the block. The bot doesn’t front-run the submitted transactions but leverages the price changes that result after each shred is executed.
Paladin can also extract MEV through DEX-CEX arbitrage and optimize routes for swaps made via DEX aggregators. However, these features are currently not used in practice, so we only briefly mention them. Since the bot is a public good, the community can contribute by adding features like NFT minting or liquidation support in the future.
The PAL token is where 10% of the value extracted by the bot in SOL gets accumulated. Paladin will go live at TGE, which will airdrop the entire supply of 1 billion PAL in the following proportions:
At the architecture level, the MEV extracted by the bot is sent to a smart contract, which then distributes it as follows:
The crucial part of the Paladin architecture is slashing. If the validator misbehaves and extracts MEV through sandwiching, staked PAL holders (other validators and their delegators) can vote to slash the rogue validator. The slashing happens if >50% of the majority is reached and stays at this level for a week. The slashed PAL is burned.
Other actions that could lead to slashing include not running Paladin, using closed-source upgrades, or not participating in slashing votes. This isn't an exhaustive list, as PAL stakers can vote to slash for other reasons at their discretion. While sandwiching is easy to spot, other "misbehaviors" may not be as obvious and would require monitoring tools, potentially leading to enforcement issues.
Unstaking PAL is capped at 5%, and a cooldown period of one month before the next withdrawal can be made.
There are several controversies about Paladin⁹. Here are common criticisms:
Validators Profit Unfairly
This is not true. Palidators (validators running Paladin) receive 90% of the MEV extracted by the bot, which they can redistribute to their delegators while keeping their standard commission. The remaining 10% goes to the PAL token, with 7.5% each going to validators and their stakers. This setup ensures validators don't take a larger share of MEV profits. If a validator doesn’t share the captured MEV, delegators can switch to one with a healthy long-term track record, like Chorus One.
Run Paladin or Die
Validators must run Paladin and avoid toxic MEV extraction or any actions that could undermine their reputation for honesty. Slashing can also occur if validators run closed-source software on top of Paladin. This doesn't mean market participants can't enhance the bot. On the contrary, they are encouraged to do so and can be rewarded in PAL if their improvements are openly available to others.
No Development Post-TGE
After the PAL airdrop, the Paladin team will no longer develop the bot¹⁰. All maintenance and strategy updates will be the community's responsibility from then on. This includes adding new liquidity pools or tokens to identify emerging MEV opportunities. While a fund has been set aside for future development, it is uncertain how long it will last. Development may stall if the incentives dry up.
With the knowledge of how Paladin works, let’s evaluate its target market and assess its performance based on our collected data.
Atomic Arbitrage Market
We will start by analyzing Jito tips paid for atomic arbitrage and compare them to the overall atomic arb market to see how much of the atomic opportunities have been captured through Jito.
We will use data from mid-August 2024¹¹ onward, when the share of Jito tips related to atomic arbitrage rose significantly. We exclude earlier data to avoid bias. Interestingly, this spike happened despite the drop in the total MEV extracted through atomic arbs, indicating increased competition among searchers now willing to share more Jito tips.
Even though tips from atomic arbs have increased compared to the total arb MEV market, they still make up only a small percentage of the total Jito tips paid.
Only 4.25% of the tips searchers paid during the sampled period were from atomic arbs (SOL 10,316 out of SOL 242,754). At a SOL price of $150, this is $1,547,400, while the total atomic MEV extraction reached $6,567,554.
So, only about 23% of the total atomic arbitrage opportunities were shared through Jito! Some striking examples include:
This shows that most on-chain arbitrage MEV is being captured outside of Jito. Unfortunately, this also leads to a high number of failed transactions.
During one of the measured five-day periods, over 1 million arbitrage transactions were made, with 519k of them submitted through the Jupiter aggregator [source]. This led to a significant number of failed transactions because:
The above data shows that Paladin can tap into a sizable on-chain arbitrage market by finding opportunities more efficiently and avoiding failed transactions. This approach would benefit validators by filling blocks with successful transactions and improving the ecosystem by reducing congestion.
The annual atomic arbitrage market is around $42.4 million. With 392 million SOL staked [source] ($58.9 billion at $150 per SOL), this could add about 0.07% APY to validator performance.
Let's dive deeper into the data to see how much market the bot can take.
Distribution and Dataset
The distribution of atomic arb MEV in USD per slot for the data collection period (15 August to 10 October 2024) looks as follows:
The median value is $0.00105 per slot, with atomic arbitrage opportunities occurring in 51.6% of slots.
Paladin operated on our main validator with a 1.15m SOL stake for a week between 4 October and 11 October. Let’s see the atomic arbitrage market opportunities during the bot's operation period:
The median value is $0.00898 per slot, and the chance of atomic arbs is present in 59.47% of slots.
The KS test shows inconsistencies in both datasets, with a positive shift in the distribution, indicating higher values in the second dataset. Therefore, Paladin operated in a more favorable environment, with more significant and more frequent MEV extraction opportunities than the broader measurement period. This is especially clear when you look at the size of Jito tips during our timeframe.
Now, let's look at how Paladin performed in these circumstances.
The median arb profit is $0 per slot, with opportunities taken only in 29.64% of slots.
Here’s a more detailed summary of all three distributions:
As we can see, Paladin underperformed, capturing significantly less MEV and earning less per slot. The bot only managed to capture 15.84% of the total available atomic arbitrage opportunities.
In some of the most striking examples, the bot extracted only 0.00004 SOL (here and here), while the actual extractable value was $127.59, as seen in Tx1, Tx2, Tx3, Tx4, and Tx5.
The reason for failing to extract MEV from the opportunities in the linked transactions is that Paladin doesn’t support the traded token ($MODENG). This is a problem since memecoins are currently driving network activity and will likely contribute the largest share of MEV. These tokens emerge rapidly, requiring frequent updates to routing. One of Paladin's top priorities should be quickly adapting to capture MEV from new memecoins as they arise, and the lack of team involvement in the process is problematic in this context.
Estimated Returns
Now, let’s run a simulation to estimate the returns under different scenarios based on a stake share of 0.3% (Chorus One's share), 1%, and 10%. The returns are capped at 15.8%, which is the portion of opportunities Paladin captured in our data.
The median value for 0.3% of the total stake is around $20k, which matches the annualized value of what Chorus One earned. This increases to about $65k for a validator with 1% of the total stake and exceeds $700k for a hypothetical validator with 10%.
We also ran a simulation to estimate how much Paladin’s performance could improve if it captured 80% of available opportunities for a validator the size of Chorus One across different adoption levels—1%, 10%, 25%, and 50% of total stake using Paladin. At an estimated 1% adoption, our validator earns an additional 0.01% APY from the bot, while the total potential atomic arbitrage could generate 0.07% of the total stake.
The simulation assumes:
And in a more tangible form:
As we see, Paladin could generate a median of additional 0.29% in APY for a validator with 0.03% of the total stake once adoption reaches 50%.
We've been in touch with the Paladin team, who confirmed that a new version of the bot, P3, is in the works. This version will pivot from focusing on the atomic arbitrage market, which they no longer see as substantial enough to prioritize.
Maintenance
The bot has been stable without major issues, but Paladin requires patches to update strategies and fix smaller bugs. Maintaining the bot is also time-consuming for the engineering team, as each patch requires a restart and the process is more complex than anticipated, adding extra overhead.This is a similar problem we faced with our Breaking Bots—maintenance and strategy update costs were high. Eventually, we concluded that the effort was not exactly worth it. With Paladin, however, a whole community could tackle this problem, so things may look different.
Paladin has great potential to boost earnings for validators and stakers by tapping into new opportunities, but it's still in the early stages of development. While our analysis shows that Paladin currently captures only around 15.84% of available atomic arbitrage opportunities, this will likely improve as the bot becomes more optimized and widely adopted. The upside is promising—the total atomic arbitrage market could add 0.07% to a validator’s APY. While capturing all of it is unlikely, even a share of this can lead to solid gains.
That said, there are challenges to address. The bot’s development will shift to the community after the token TGE, raising questions about whether there will be enough resources and motivation for continuous updates. Additionally, maintaining the bot on the validator side can be tricky, as each patch requires a restart, making it time-consuming for validators to run.
At Chorus One, we believe that the long-term health of the Solana ecosystem is paramount. Paladin builds on the same core principles as Jito—to mitigate the toxic MEV and democratize good MEV.
We developed Breaking Bots with these ideas in mind, and we see Paladin as an extension of our efforts. Two solutions are better than one, and Paladin offers an interesting alternative to what exists today. Supporting multiple approaches is a cornerstone of decentralized systems, and we welcome new ideas that build resilience.
While we don't agree with all of Paladin's choices, especially regarding the team's lack of future bot development, we believe its success will benefit the entire ecosystem, and that's why we support it.
That being said, if the core principles Paladin is built on change, or the maintenance costs outweigh the benefits in the mid-term, we will reevaluate our position.
References:
1 You can find an interesting overview of arbitrage MEV here.
2 A detailed analysis of liquidations in DeFi is available in this paper.
3 More about the NFT MEV here.
4 Chorus One also provided an analysis on Solana sandwiching in here.
5 An in-depth write-up on searchers by Blockworks is here.
6 Information based on Jito documentation.
7 At Chorus One, in our “Breaking Bots” paper, we proposed a similar solution. The implementation details are available on GitHub.
8 Information based on series blogposts by the Paladin team.
9 Some of the examples available here, here,
10 Per the blogpost: We’re not a Foundation or Labs — we don’t run any part of Paladin, we don’t develop it, we don’t maintain it…
11 The data used in this section is available here and can be retrieved using these queries.
About Chorus One
Chorus One is one of the largest institutional staking providers globally, operating infrastructure for over 60 Proof-of-Stake (PoS) networks, including Ethereum, Cosmos, Solana, Avalanche, Near, and others. Since 2018, we have been at the forefront of the PoS industry, offering easy-to-use, enterprise-grade staking solutions, conducting industry-leading research, and investing in innovative protocols through Chorus One Ventures. As an ISO 27001 certified provider, Chorus One also offers slashing and double-signing insurance to its institutional clients. For more information, visit chorus.one or follow us on LinkedIn, X (formerly Twitter), and Telegram.
In the context of Ethereum and Proof-of-Stake (PoS) networks, the Annual Percentage Rate (APR) is often presented as a clear and accessible measure of validator performance. As a summary statistic, APR seeks to answer a straightforward question: If I stake 32 ETH today, how much can I expect to have after one year?
However, APR is fundamentally an oversimplification of a highly complex system. Its role as both a measure of past returns and a forecasting tool obscures the intricate dynamics that govern validator rewards on Ethereum.
For example, using APR to predict future returns is like:
- > Using a small sample of stocks from the S&P 500 to estimate the average yearly return —similar to how APR behaves for small validators.
-> Using just 1-2 years of S&P 500 data to forecast long-term returns —similar to relying on short-term APR data like 7-day or 30-day rates.
This article aims to unpack the underlying biases of APR, explore the stochastic nature of validator rewards, and propose alternative metrics that offer a more accurate assessment of node operator performance—metrics which align more closely with operational realities. Finally, we will examine how Chorus One’s approach, incorporating our proprietary MEV-boost fork, Adagio, captures a more refined understanding of Ethereum staking dynamics. By optimizing the interaction with Ethereum’s proposer-builder separation, Adagio allows us to consistently improve validator efficiency, resulting in tangible improvements in performance without relying on the variability of APR metrics.
Ethereum validators are compensated through two primary reward streams:
While the attestation process is deterministic, rewards from block proposals and MEV are inherently probabilistic. This variability introduces a fundamental challenge: APR assumes a uniform distribution of rewards across validators, which is far from reality. The skewed nature of the reward distribution makes APR a poor proxy for expected returns, especially over shorter time horizons.
The central flaw in using APR as a measure of validator performance lies in its failure to account for the randomness that defines much of the reward structure. To illustrate this, consider the following:
As these rewards are driven by skewed distributions, their mean value—a key input for APR—becomes a biased estimator. Skewness is a measure of how asymmetrically data is distributed , see e.g. here. In probability theory, the mean of a skewed distribution is a poor representation of the typical outcome. Validators who are fortunate enough to receive multiple block proposals or sync committee assignments will see a disproportionately higher APR compared to validators who, through no fault of their own, are assigned fewer opportunities.
To further understand how randomness impacts APR, it is useful to visualize the reward distribution for validators operating at different scales.
The plot above shows how reward skewness changes based on the number of validators controlled. Precisely, higher is the skewness, longer is the upper tail, indicating that the overall distribution is asymmetric on the right. The consequence is that the mean is higher than the median. MEV rewards are the most skewed (bottom-right), meaning they vary the most between validators. Sync committee selection also has a significant impact (top-left), while block proposals have the least skew (bottom-left).
What’s clear is that as the number of validators increases, the skewness in rewards drops significantly. This means larger validator sets see more consistent rewards, while smaller sets face more variability due to randomness. The same holds true even by accounting for only a smaller time period instead of the whole year data.
-> This highlights why APR, when viewed in isolation, is not a reliable measure of performance, particularly for node operators running fewer validators.
This plot shows the distribution of simulated APR assuming different number of validators controlled. It is evident how the APR becomes reliable only when the number of controlled validators is high compared with the number of active validators (purple and cyan histograms). This is because, as we saw earlier, when more validators are controlled, the skewness in rewards decreases, making APR more reliable.
It is worth noting that, the aggregate APR of an entity controlling more validators is not the APR of a single customer, usually holding a lower number of validators. In this case, the APR of the small subset is affected by higher variance as in the case of low number of validators controlled.
However, when rewards are pooled—such as in solutions like Chorus One’s ETH staking vault on Stakewise —this variance is minimized. By pooling rewards across many validators, customers gain exposure to the performance of top-tier node operators while benefiting from a more consistent and stable APR.
In light of these insights, what should we look at when evaluating a validator’s true performance? A more reliable framework involves focusing on the operational aspects that are within the control of the validator:
These metrics provide a far more grounded understanding of validator performance than APR, which often serves more as a reflection of stochastic luck than actual skill or operational consistency.
At Chorus One, we approach Ethereum staking with a deep commitment to performance optimization. While APR figures may fluctuate due to the randomness of block proposals, we have developed sophisticated tools to maximize validator returns and minimize variance.
Central to this approach is Adagio, our internally optimized MEV-boost client. Adagio improves Execution Layer rewards by optimizing the way we interact with block builders. Specifically, we have introduced latency parameters that allow us to extract higher MEV rewards without compromising slot accuracy. This gives our validators a distinct advantage in capturing Execution Layer rewards, effectively smoothing out the variability that undermines traditional APR metrics.
Moreover, our focus on uptime and effectiveness ensures that our validators consistently outperform industry benchmarks. By maintaining near-perfect operational performance and leveraging cutting-edge tools like Adagio, Chorus One is able to deliver superior returns over the long term, irrespective of the randomness that defines APR calculations.
Source: Ethereum Network
Source: Chorus One
Over the past 30 days, Adagio has delivered an 8.45% increase in MEV rewards compared to a standard configuration without Adagio.
For real-time tracking of Adagio's MEV rewards and to explore its performance further, visit our live dashboard: Adagio Dashboard.
APR, while often used as a shorthand for node operator performance, is a fundamentally flawed metric. Its reliance on skewed distributions and random events, such as block proposals and sync committee participation, makes it a biased estimator for expected returns. Instead of focusing on APR, a more reliable approach to evaluating validator performance involves analyzing metrics like effectiveness, uptime, and frequency of fulfilled duties.
At Chorus One, our focus on operational precision and technical advancement allows us to consistently deliver reliable performance. With solutions like Adagio, we enhance reward optimization, offering staking outcomes that navigate the inherent volatility and randomness of APR-based assessments.
Staking ETH with Chorus One is effortless—just a few clicks, and you’re on your way to earning rewards. No hassle, just seamless staking.
Start staking today: https://opus.chorus.one/pool/stake/
Or, speak to our team to learn more.
Learn more about MEV and Ethereum node operator performance:
MEV:Metrics that Matter
Timing Games and Implications on MEV extraction
Check out all our research reports
About Chorus One
Chorus One is one of the largest institutional staking providers globally, operating infrastructure for over 60 Proof-of-Stake (PoS) networks, including Ethereum, Cosmos, Solana, Avalanche, Near, and others. Since 2018, we have been at the forefront of the PoS industry, offering easy-to-use, enterprise-grade staking solutions, conducting industry-leading research, and investing in innovative protocols through Chorus One Ventures. As an ISO 27001 certified provider, Chorus One also offers slashing and double-signing insurance to its institutional clients. For more information, visit chorus.one or follow us on LinkedIn, X (formerly Twitter), and Telegram.
